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Aid goes to poor countries to help them escape from poverty, but in the 
presence of non-benevolent leaders who have an interest to maintain high 
levels of foreign assistance to increase their private rent, the reform effort 
towards developmental policies is sub-optimal. This chapter reviews the 
theoretical literature devoted to the study of the incentive problems of aid 
allocation and to the definition of optimal aid contracts. The chapter will 
identify areas of potential improvement in literature modelling aid as 
targeted for multiple objectives. When aid is linked to the governance 
level, besides than to the poverty level, of the recipient country, the 
endogeneity of poverty and corruption related issues has not yet been 
taken into consideration. Moreover, the political economy of the donor 
has not yet been integrated as a pivotal feature of aid models. 
 











The aim of the study is to check whether the emphasis on good governance 
by multilateral agencies is reflected in aid allocation decisions.  
We study if and how informal governance determines multilateral aid 
allocations with a panel of 115 countries over the period 1997-2009. The 
endogeneity of aid on governance is tackled with a set of instruments 
including ethnic fractionalization and the legal origin of the recipient 
country, in a GMM-Diff setting. 
Despite the leading role of public governance in determining the success 
of development policies and the commitment of some donors to more 
selective aid, there is still no evidence that multilateral aid allocation takes 
good governance into account at the aggregate level. However, there is 
evidence that aid increases with governance up to the third governance 
quartile and that concessional loans are responsive to governance levels.  
 


















This study explores how the selectivity of multilateral aid varies over 
time. We employ a three-dimensional panel ranging from 1980 to 2008 
with 127 recipient countries and 4 multilateral bodies: the World Bank 
(WB) IDA, the IMF, the United Nations, and the European Commission. 
The aim of the paper is twofold: first, we provide a scrutiny of the three 
selectivity criteria most often addressed in the literature, i) selectivity on 
poverty and needs, ii) selectivity on democratic institutions, iii) 
selectivity on economic policies. Secondly, we evaluate the variation 
over time of donors' political-strategic motives by studying the 
correlation between aid and the UN General Assembly voting alignment 
and Security Council membership. 
At the aggregate level, we find no change in the responsiveness to 
poverty, whereas there is a decrease in the emphasis on which sound 
institutions and policies are targeted from 1998 onward. Moreover, an 
intensification of the political economy motives behind multilateral aid 
allocation is displayed. The general figures are mostly driven by the EC 
and the UN, while the WB IDA exhibits increasing selectivity on 
democracy and, together with the IMF concessional lending is 
nowadays less concerned with political-strategic motives. Results are 
robust to static and dynamic fixed effects, random effect Tobit, and 
GMM Sys models. 
 
Keywords: Aid Allocation, Selectivity, Multilateral Aid, Voting Alignment,  
